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courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD586, SAVING THE F-16 PROGRAM

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cable's unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09ISLAMABAD586**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09ISLAMABAD586	2009-03-18 16:27	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Islamabad

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.thehindu.com/news/article2059881.ece?homepage=true>

VZCZCXRO3014
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #0586/01 0771627
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181627Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1940
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0033
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 9923
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 4660
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 1306
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 6969
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 5896
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000586

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2018
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [PGOV](#) [MARR](#) [MOPS](#) [PK](#)
SUBJECT: SAVING THE F-16 PROGRAM

REF: ISLAMABAD 177 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

[1](#)1. (C) Summary. Pakistan is the most important front-line state in our battle against extremists who threaten the U.S. and our allies. In
[1](#)2. (C) Although the economy is stabilizing, we do not believe the GOP has or will find the \$2 billion plus required to complete the entire F
[1](#)3. (C) While we understand New Delhi's opposition to the program, the reality is that this program will not degrade India's overwhelming air
[1](#)4. (C) The Pressler Amendment sanctions that prevented the Clinton Administration from delivering 28 Peacegate F-16 aircraft that Pakistan f
[1](#)5. (C) What is broadly referred to as the "F-16 case" is really three individual cases: (1) a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program purchase
Overcoming the Trust Deficit

[1](#)6. (C) The F-16 package is the flagship symbol of renewed post 9/11 engagement with the Pakistani military. It is difficult to over-emphasi
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deliver the aircraft that Pakistan had paid for, but demanded that Pakistan pay demurrage charges for storing them; finally, in 1998, the USG

[1](#)7. (C) Increasing trust with the military is the basis for the security pillar of our counter-insurgency strategy, i.e., expanding Frontier
Enhancing Pakistani COIN Capability

[1](#)8. (C) Our goal is to enable Pakistan to fight the militants using Pakistani safe havens so that we will not have to deploy U.S. troops to c
[1](#)9. (C) If our goal is to press the Army to change strategy and redeploy forces from the Indian border, punishing the Air Force by canceling
Maintaining Cargo Operations

[1](#)10. (C) Approximately 30 percent of the fuel and 70 percent of the dry cargo required to support U.S. troops in Afghanistan transits Pakista
Regional Stability

[1](#)11. (C) To overcome overwhelming Indian military superiority, Pakistan developed both its nuclear/missile program and its air power. F-16 a

[1](#)12. (C) India enjoys an almost 2-1 advantage (736 to 370) over Pakistan in advanced multi-purpose fighters. Pakistan's shortfalls in traini
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significant new technologies and further expand its air superiority over Pakistan.

[1](#)13. (C) The sale of new aircraft and 500 AMRAAM missiles would give Pakistan beyond visual range capability, but Pakistan will acquire the a

[1](#)14. (C) We do deny Pakistan requests for arms sales that could upset the regional balance of power. Post on February 20 recommended that We
Building Civilian Control of the Military

[1](#)15. (C) Pakistan's civilian leaders want increased economic assistance, but they need to demonstrate to the military the benefits of support

[1](#)16. (C) Officially suggesting that the Pakistanis use Coalition Support Funds (CSF) would, post believes, create issues over congressional i

Bottom Line

¶17. (C) Post agrees with State that it is unlikely we will/should convince Congress to use FMF to pick up the tab for the entire F-16 program.
PATTERSON